


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
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CIADI-----INSITREP 93-002

## International Narcotics Review



February 1993

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
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

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International Narcotics  
Review ☐

February 1993

1 Perspective--- Assessing Counternarcotics Effectiveness---A Long View ☐

5 Peru: Pushing To Close Campanilla Airstrip ☐

9

13

17

21

24

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33

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February 1993

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**International Narcotics  
Review**

February 1993

**Perspective**

**Assessing Counternarcotics Effectiveness—A Long View**

Key measures for evaluating the effectiveness of foreign counternarcotics efforts—

include foreign government willingness to increased antidrug cooperation and the extent to which antidrug programs force traffickers to find new, more costly and more risky, ways to do business.

Many governments in drug-producing or major transshipment countries are now engaged in counternarcotics cooperation. While meeting the terms of various US or other Western aid programs is an important motivation—some of their efforts are almost entirely dependent on foreign aid—many governments have come to see the insidious effect of the drug trade on their own societies, including rising addict populations and undermining of legitimate political and economic systems. Antidrug cooperation worldwide is at unprecedented levels. Some governments, like Colombia and Mexico, have committed substantial resources of their own to counternarcotics. A few, like Colombia, have taken strong initiatives to prosecute vigorous and sustained law enforcement operations to dismantle or cripple their country's top trafficking organizations.

The depth of a government's commitment and extent of effort in the war on drugs often depends on the political realities it must face, including competing demands for resources and attention to other significant domestic problems. Many antidrug programs with modest goals, even if only in response to foreign suasion, and limited results can be the foundation for more significant progress later. Once antidrug efforts become more institutionalized and achieve successes—no matter how small they may seem—momentum can build for more substantial programs and greater levels of commitment and effort.

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[REDACTED]

Although traffickers are highly adaptive, disrupting their networks and forcing them to find new transshipment routes and methods for smuggling drugs or to make new transportation or financing and money-laundering arrangements can significantly increase the costs and risks of the trade. Antidrug actions such as seizing transportation assets, closing front companies, or arresting key brokers or money managers often result in missed deadlines, significant financial losses, and mutual suspicions and sometimes bloody recriminations.

[REDACTED]

Evidence of disruption to the drug trade by how traffickers adjust their operations and respond to government pressures is the best indicator of trends in counternarcotics performance. Counternarcotics progress cannot be judged only on the immediate payoff because, unlike conventional wars—or even many insurgencies—the “war on drugs” does not lend itself to simple criteria of victory, largely because the drug trade itself is so decentralized. Indeed, the “enemy” in the drug war is a myriad of actors, motivated almost exclusively by the prospects of enormous profit, who are not dependent on any sophisticated or hard-to-acquire infrastructure. While trafficking groups have an organization and infrastructure that can be identified and targeted, they are not interdependent. For every organization that is dismantled or for every drug lord arrested, another can quickly move in to fill the void. No one group plays such a dominant role in the drug trade that its elimination would end drug trafficking.

[REDACTED]

Moreover, traffickers are highly adaptive, since their goal is primarily to stay in an extremely profitable business. Narcotics processing laboratories, trafficking routes and methods, and transshipment nodes are diverse and decentralized, and none are indispensable for the movement of drugs. As a

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result, traffickers are much less likely to directly confront counternarcotics pressures against their infrastructure than to evade them and develop processing, trafficking, or money-laundering alternatives—a less demanding and costly task.

Because of traffickers' flexibility, antidrug efforts are characterized by many small successes and setbacks over a relatively long time that are difficult to detect and interpret. Their cumulative effects almost always are ambiguous and rarely add up to any clear trends, especially over the short term.

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### Peru: Pushing To Close Campanilla Airstrip

Peru's continuing efforts to deny drug traffickers access to Campanilla—a major airstrip in the heart of the Huallaga Valley—illustrate that Peruvian leaders can be responsive to US counternarcotics concerns when they calculate that political risks are tolerable. We believe Lima will sustain its efforts at Campanilla and—with an eye toward the need for US support—has indicated it will take similar steps against other airstrips in the valley.

### An Important Trafficking Hub

In 1991, Peru's most notorious narcotrafficker—Demetrio Limonier Chaves Pena Herrera, also known as "Vaticano," widened a portion of the highway near the town of Campanilla to serve as a transport hub for his activities in the Upper Huallaga Valley. Traffickers found Campanilla especially attractive because of its central location, proximity to cocaine laboratories, well-maintained landing strip, and relative security from insurgent forces.


an effort to boost relations with Washington—implemented new counternarcotics initiatives, including the deployment of military detachments to patrol municipal airfields in the Huallaga Valley and initial steps to control clandestine airstrips.

### The Tug of War Over Campanilla

The government and the traffickers have been vying for control of the airstrip since last August. Following the April 1992 coup, President Fujimori—probably in

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
**Looking Ahead: Engagements and Capabilities**

Although the effort to close Campanilla is only a first step in controlling clandestine airstrips in the Huallaga Valley, the operation demonstrates Peru's increasing level of engagement


Indeed, the Peruvian President reportedly may send more forces to monitor municipal airports where activity has increased. For example, the press is reporting that a 50-man unit will be sent to Saposo to guard the airport. Moreover, we believe that Fujimori may expand Peru's runway denial campaign to other clandestine airstrips.

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
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
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
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
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
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~~Secret~~**Highlights** ☐**Latin America****Central America's Emerging Role in Heroin Transshipment** ☐

South American drug traffickers—who move multiton shipments of cocaine through Central America via air, maritime, and overland routes—are apparently beginning to use established cocaine-trafficking routes to transport heroin to US and European markets. In a series of operations over the past year, Costa Rica and Panama made their first seizures of heroin probably from Colombia. Most of the seizures were from drug couriers who were carrying heroin—less than 2 kilograms a load—through airports en route to the United States. The seizures suggest South American traffickers are now using cocaine transport routes that have served them well in the past for the transport of heroin. ☐

As Colombia—long a cocaine processing center—expands its heroin production and processing capability, the drug is likely to be detected transiting Central America with increasing frequency. Heroin has a much higher street price in the United States than cocaine, and the small size of heroin shipments relative to cocaine shipments will probably make interdiction efforts more difficult for Central American governments whose counternarcotics efforts are currently geared more toward interdicting the larger cocaine loads. ☐


**Heroin Seizures From South America Surging** ☐


Seizure statistics suggest that Colombian groups have significantly increased their efforts to move heroin into the United States from South America. ☐

☐ he number of seizures from Colombians rose dramatically in 1991 and 1992 in both weight and number. Most of the heroin has been seized from Colombian air passengers from Bogota or from other points in the country who have swallowed 500 to 1,100 grams, although one Colombian courier managed to ingest 1.8 kilograms (kg), the most ever seized from a “swallower” entering the United States. However, the most significant Colombian heroin seizure to date was 15 kg of heroin airdropped onto a beach near Isabela, Puerto Rico, in June 1992. ☐

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**Total Colombian Heroin Seizures, 1990-92***Kilograms*<sup>a</sup>Through 30 September.

The airdrop indicates the Colombian cartels are using established smuggling routes to move heroin. The sudden surge of couriers and consistency in methods also suggest a coherent plan rather than individual initiatives. We presume most traffickers are carrying heroin produced in Colombia—rather than transshipping Asian heroin—though the judgment will remain tentative without a scientifically based signature for the Colombian product. 




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**Colombian Heroin Arrests by Port of Entry, 1992**


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*Number of arrests*


Note: Two couriers were arrested in Houston (1 July and 1 September) and one courier was arrested in Puerto Rico in September.

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
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


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





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
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
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